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Abstract—We explore the additional security obtained by
noise at the physical layer in a wiretap channel model setting.
Security enhancements at the physical layer have been proposed
recently using a secrecy metric based on the degrees of freedom
that an attacker has with respect to the sent ciphertext. Prior
work focused on cases in which the wiretap channel could be
modeled as statistically independent packet erasure channels for
the legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper. In this paper, we
go beyond the state-of-the-art by addressing correlated erasure
events across the two communication channels. The resulting
security enhancement is presented as a function of the correlation
coefficient and the erasure probabilities for both channels. It is
shown that security improvements are achievable by means of
judicious physical-layer design even when the eavesdropper has
a better channel than the legitimate receiver. The only case in
which this assertion may not hold is when erasures are highly
correlated across channels. However, we are able to prove that
correlation cannot nullify the expected security enhancement if
the channel quality of the legitimate receiver is strictly better
than that of the eavesdropper.
I. INTRODUCTION
The origins of physical-layer security were laid down by
Shannon [1] and Wyner [2] in seminal papers. Due to these
works, and the contributions of others, it is known that channel
codes exist that can achieve both reliability and security
in relevant communication scenarios. The wiretap channel
model presented in [2] is instrumental to this fact. Since
that time, the goals of physical-layer security research have
been twofold: first, to develop understanding of theoretical
fundamental bounds on secrecy; and second, to design prac-
tical codes which achieve the secrecy bounds (see [3] and
its references). Unfortunately, meeting theoretically-achievable
secrecy bounds within a practical coding scheme often requires
assumptions which may be unrealistic in practice. For exam-
ple, some designs offer reliability to legitimate parties based
on the premise that the main channel is noiseless [4], [5]. Other
designs assume that the encoder has perfect channel state
information (CSI) for friendly parties and malicious parties
alike [6]. Finally, nearly every physical-layer security scheme
cannot maintain secrecy when an eavesdropper has a consistent
advantage in channel quality.
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As a result, the point was made in [7] that physical-
layer security should be thought of as an extra layer of
secrecy which can aid security efforts at other layers in the
communications protocol stack. The coding scheme presented
in [7], [8] was developed with the intent of avoiding unrealistic
assumptions for practical application of a secrecy code which
enhances security using stopping sets in punctured low-density
parity-check (LDPC) codes. The added security was measured
in the number of degrees of freedom D in an eavesdropper’s
information regarding the ciphertext, or equivalently in equiv-
ocation [7]. The design is impervious to a lack of CSI, because
it ensures that E[D] exceeds any fixed β for nearly every
possible combination of channel parameters as the dimension
of the encoder increases. Thus, security enhancement occurs
in the system even when an eavesdropper has a better channel
than the legitimate receiver.
Despite the advantages of this scheme, as with other practi-
cal designs, a simplifying assumption was made in the security
analysis where erasure events for legitimate receivers and
eavesdroppers were assumed to be statistically independent.
However, in real radio environments, channels from a transmit-
ter to different receivers may be correlated depending on the
physical deployment of the receiver antennas, the availability
of line-of-sight, and the presence or absence of scatterers at
the transmitter and receivers [9], [10].
Therefore, we address the effects of correlation between
packet erasures at an intended receiver and packet erasures
at the eavesdropper on the performance of the physical-layer
security design from [8]. The key contributions of this work
are the following:
• Security Analysis for Correlated Erasures: Using degrees
of freedom in the eavesdropper’s knowledge of the ci-
phertext, the security analysis is made for the correlated
packet erasure channel model. Comparisons are given
between the correlated and uncorrelated cases.
• Correlation Coefficient Boundaries: Bounds on the cor-
relation coefficient are derived, and analysis of security
enhancement is provided assuming best and worst corre-
lation conditions.
• Security Enhancement: It is shown that in many cases
security enhancement can still be obtained, even when
the eavesdropper has a better channel than the legitimate
receiver and erasures are correlated. We also prove that
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Fig. 1. Wiretap channel model with feedback assuming correlated packet
erasures in the main channel Qm and the wiretap channel Qw .
correlation cannot reduce E[D] to zero if the legitimate
receiver’s channel quality is strictly better than that of the
eavesdropper.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section II we
discuss the correlated wiretap channel model with feedback,
and boundary properties of the correlation coefficient. We
briefly discuss stopping sets, degrees of freedom as a security
metric, and present the encoder and decoder from [8] in
Section III. The security results for the correlated wiretap
packet erasure channel model are given in Section IV, and
conclusions are provided in Section V.
II. CORRELATED CHANNEL MODEL
We consider the wiretap channel model with memoryless
packet erasure channels (PEC), and add automatic repeat
request (ARQ) for authenticated users as shown in Fig. 1.
A user named Alice encodes an encrypted and compressed
message M into a set of η packets denoted X according to a
specific encoding rule. The packets are then transmitted over
the main channel Qm to an intended recipient named Bob who
receives the set of packets Y where packet erasures occur with
probability δ. Bob is permitted to request the retransmission of
any missing packets using an authenticated feedback channel.
After obtaining all transmitted packets, he applies the decoding
rule and obtains an estimate of the secret message M˜ . An
eavesdropper named Eve also observes the transmitted packets,
albeit through a different channel called the wiretap channel
Qw. Eve obtains the packets Z through Qw, by observing
the initial transmission as well as any retransmitted packets.
Erasures occur in this channel with probability ǫ. She also
attempts to decode the data and obtains an estimate of the
secret message Mˆ .
Since Qm and Qw are memoryless, erasures occur inde-
pendently with respect to one another in a given channel;
however, erasures across channels are correlated with corre-
lation coefficient ρ. Let Em and Ew be Bernoulli random
variables which take on values in the set {0, 1}, where one
signifies erasure and zero signifies error-free reception of a
packet. Thus, Pr(Em = 1) = δ and Pr(Ew = 1) = ǫ. The
covariance of two random variables A and B is defined as
cov(A,B) = E[(A−E[A])(B−E[B])], and the variance of a
random variable A can be expressed as var(A) = cov(A,A)
[11]. Given these definitions, the Pearson correlation coeffi-
cient between random variables Em and Ew is [11]
ρ =
cov (Em, Ew)√
var (Em) var (Ew)
=
E[EmEw]− E[Em]E[Ew ]√
(E[E2m]− E[Em]2)(E[E2w ]− E[Ew]2)
=
E[EmEw]− δǫ√
δ(1− δ)ǫ(1− ǫ) . (1)
The last step is made using the first and second moments of
a Bernoulli random variable, where E[Em] = E[E2m] = δ and
E[Ew] = E[E
2
w] = ǫ. Let pij = Pr(Em = i, Ew = j) [12].
Then, δ = p10 + p11 = E[Em] and ǫ = p01 + p11 = E[Ew ]. It
is trivial to show that E[EmEw] is equal to Pr(Em = 1, Ew =
1). Thus, (1) can be expressed as
ρ =
p11 − δǫ√
δ(1 − δ)ǫ(1− ǫ) . (2)
The Pearson correlation coefficient is commonly used to
indicate the degree to which two random variables are similar.
Although |ρ| ≤ 1, it is a common misconception that ρ can
take on any value from −1 to +1. In reality, there are bounds
to the coefficient which are a function of the distribution of the
random variables involved [13]. In our case, we have allowed
δ and ǫ to take on any value in [0, 1]. We also know that
δ = p11 + p10, ǫ = p11 + p01, and p00 + p01 + p10 + p11 = 1.
Since pij ≥ 0 for i, j ∈ {0, 1}, then
max(δ + ǫ − 1, 0) ≤ p11 ≤ min(δ, ǫ). (3)
The bounds on p11 can be given as bounds on ρ as
max(δ + ǫ− 1, 0)− δǫ√
δǫ(1− δ)(1 − ǫ) ≤ ρ ≤
min(δ, ǫ)− δǫ√
δǫ(1− δ)(1− ǫ) . (4)
For example, if δ = 0.3 and ǫ = 0.15, then −0.275 ≤ ρ ≤
0.642.
III. ENCODER AND DECODER DESIGN
The goal of the security sub-system from [8] is to inflict Eve
with stopping sets in her received codewords, thus forcing her
to guess the values of D bits in the decoder. Even a single
error in the guess is magnified so the ciphertext has bit-error
rate 0.5. Block diagrams of the encoder and decoder are given
in Figs. 2 and 3. We now provide a brief explanation of the
system.1
A. Stopping Sets
Consider the message-passing (MP) decoder of an LDPC
code C [14] over the binary erasure channel (BEC). It helps
to think of the N − k × N parity check matrix H , along
with its Tanner graph representation. Let V = (v1, v2, . . . , vN )
be a set of vertices called variable nodes. Also let U =
(u1, u2, . . . , uN−k) be a set of vertices called check nodes.
Finally let GC be the Tanner graph representation of H , where
GC is bipartite with bipartitions V and U . An edge connects
1For further details, the reader is referred to [7] and [8].
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Fig. 2. Detailed block diagram of the encoder. Number and size of blocks
or packets are indicated at each step.
ui with vj if and only if Hi,j = 1. Then all variable nodes
connected to a particular check node form a checksum which
is satisfied for all valid codewords in C.
Definition 1 (Di, et. al. [15]). A stopping set is a set Λ ⊆ V
such that all check nodes in N(Λ) are connected to Λ by at
least two edges, where N(Λ) signifies the neighborhood of Λ
and is defined as the set of all adjacent nodes to Λ in GC .
Since by definition, the empty set is also a stopping set, each
set of variable nodes has a maximal stopping set in it. If the
standard MP decoder over the BEC is applied to a codeword
where bits corresponding to V ′ ⊆ V are erased, then the set
of unknown bits after decoding is the maximal stopping set in
V ′ [15].
B. Encoder
An encrypted and compressed message M is grouped
into L blocks of length k. Allow the final block to be
completed with random bits if necessary. Specifically, M =
(m1,m2, . . . ,mL) where mi = (mi1,mi2, . . . ,mik). Since M
is compressed, the bits of the message are such that each block
takes on one of 2k possible bit patterns uniformly at random.
Each mi is then channel coded using a nonsystematic LDPC
code. This encoding is done in two steps. First, the ith k-bit
message block mi is scrambled using a k × k matrix S for
i = 1, 2, . . . , L. The scrambler S is formed by generating
random k × k binary matrices until one is found for which
an inverse exists in GF(2). S−1 is calculated using the LU
factorization tailored to GF(2). The scrambling operation is
ai = miS. This yields a set of L scrambled blocks A, each
of size k. The scrambler is followed by a systematic (N, k)
LDPC encoding using the k×N generator matrix G of a code
C. The output codewords are then bi = aiG. There are L of
them, and each has length N .
The LDPC code in the encoder must meet certain criteria. It
was shown in [8] that a set of coded bits R can be punctured
from a codeword in C such that the maximal stopping set in
R is the empty set, and the maximal stopping set in R+ v is
nonempty ∀v /∈ R. If a nonempty stopping set exists in the
set of erasures in a given codeword, then there also exists a
minimum-sized set of bits which must be guessed in order to
allow the MP decoder to completely solve for the codeword.
The size of this minimum-sized set is the number of degrees of
freedom D. We require the code used by this encoder to have
an associating R such that |R| = N − k. The reason for such
a choice is tied to a relationship between MP and maximum-
likelihood (ML) decoders. It is shown in [7, Lemma 3] that
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Fig. 3. Detailed block diagram of Bob’s decoder. Number and size of blocks
or packets are indicated at each step.
under such encoder constraints DML = DMP = |Rc|, i.e. the
number of degrees of freedom in the ML decoder and MP
decoder are equal, and equivalent to the number of channel
erased bits |Rc|. Thus, although the MP decoder is known to
be suboptimal to the ML decoder, when |R| = N − k the two
provide the same performance. A random algorithm for finding
such an R was given in [8], and irregular degree distributions
have been found which return puncturing patterns of this
nature with reasonable probability [7]. Each codeword in the
set of output codewords B = (b1, b2, . . . , bL) is punctured
according to R to form the set of punctured codewords
P = (p1, p2, . . . , pL) where each pi = (pi1, pi2, . . . , pin). Since
each punctured codeword has blocklength n, the effective rate
of this encoder is k/n.
Finally, these punctured codewords are distributed amongst
η packets in an interleaver denoted Π so that α bits from all
L codewords are in each packet. The set of packets is denoted
X = (x1, x2, . . . , xη), and each packet xi has length αL.
Thus, n = ηα.2 Note that the interleaver Π which spreads
α bits from each punctured codeword into each packet, also
yields equality in D across codewords (see [7, Corollary 1]).
C. Decoder
The decoder consists of the following pieces: a buffer ca-
pable of holding all received data packets Y , a deinterleaving
function Π−1 which inverts the interleaving in the encoder
to yield the punctured codewords P˜ , the standard MP decoder
with output codewords B˜ of which the systematic bits form the
scrambled message blocks A˜, and finally the descrambler S−1
which supplies an estimate of the compressed ciphertext M˜
as m˜i = aiS−1. Notice that these collections of packets and
codewords describe Bob’s decoder. Eve’s decoder is similar,
except we denote the received data packets as Z , and then Pˆ ,
Aˆ, Bˆ, and Mˆ form the eavesdroppers respective estimates of
P , A, B, and M .
IV. SECURITY FOR CORRELATED CHANNELS
The security results for the correlated channel model from
Section II are presented and compared with results given in
[7] and [8] for the independent channel case. We assume that
the degree distribution for the LDPC code and the puncturing
pattern R are chosen such that |R| = N − k. Thus, the MP
decoder achieves the ML performance, and furthermore, D is
equivalent for each decoded codeword.
2It is assumed that α divides n for ease of notation.
A. Main Security Results
The first result is the distribution on D.
Lemma 1. Assume the encoder specified in Section III-B
where |R| = N − k. If Qm and Qw are memoryless, and
erasures in the two channels are correlated, then the random
variable D which takes on the degrees of freedom in a received
codeword is a scaled binomial random variable. Thus, for
1 ≤ β ≤ αη,
Pr(D ≥ β) = 1−
⌈β/α⌉−1∑
i=0
(
η
i
)
(1− Pr(Ref ))i Pr(Ref )η−i
(5)
where Ref is the event that a particular packet is received
error-free by Eve.
Proof: The proof is identical to that for Lemma 4 in [7],
because although erasures in Qm and Qw are correlated, each
packet is received error-free by Eve independent from other
packets. This allows each transmitted packet to be considered
a Bernoulli experiment as to whether Eve receives the packet.
The sum of the missing packets is binomial with success
parameter 1− Pr(Ref ). The distribution in (5) follows.
Another result which was found to apply to the indepen-
dent erasure case in [7] follows directly from Lemma 1 for
correlated erasures as well.
Theorem 1. If |R| = N − k in the encoder, then k/n = 1,
and
E[D] = H(X |Z) = (1−Pr(Ref ))n = (1−Pr(Ref ))k. (6)
Proof: Since |R| = N − k, then n = |Q| = N − |R| =
k. Let us consider the model for a single codeword (L =
1). We can then assume η independent uses of a PEC with
packets of length α. Let X = (x1, x2, . . . , xη) be the input
to the channel, and Z = (z1, z2, . . . , zη) be the output, where
α bits are erased with probability 1 − Pr(Ref ) or received
error-free with probability Pr(Ref ) with each channel use.
The input distribution on α bits is uniform because the input
distribution on M is uniform, and the encoding function of
rate one forms a bijection on k bits. Thus, H(xi) = α for i =
1, 2, . . . , η. It can be shown that H(zi|xi) = H(1−Pr(Ref )),
and H(zi) = H(1 − Pr(Ref )) + Pr(Ref )α (see [16], pg.
188). Then, H(xi|zi) = H(zi|xi)−H(zi) +H(xi) = α(1−
Pr(Ref )). Therefore, with η independent uses of the channel
(one for each packet), H(X |Z) = (1 − Pr(Ref ))ηα = (1 −
Pr(Ref ))n. Since the mean of a binomial random variable is
the product of its two parameters, E[D/α] = (1−Pr(Ref ))η,
which concludes the proof.
The remaining necessary task to characterize D is to solve
for Pr(Ref ) when erasures in Qm and Qw are correlated with
correlation coefficient ρ. If such an expression reverts back to
the independent case when ρ = 0, then as long as erasures are
uncorrelated, and Qm and Qw are memoryless, the previous
result for independent erasures applies. It was shown in [8]
that for statistically independent Qm and Qw,
Pr(Ref ) =
1− ǫ
1− ǫδ . (7)
Lemma 2. In the wiretap channel scenario with feedback, if
channel erasures are correlated events across Qm and Qw
with correlation coefficient ρ, then the probability that Eve
obtains a single transmitted packet error-free is given as
Pr(Ref ) =
1− ǫ
1− ǫδ − ρ
√
δǫ(1− δ)(1 − ǫ) . (8)
Proof: Let W be the total number of times that Bob
requests a single packet over Qm before he obtains it error-
free. Since Qm is memoryless, the packet is erased each time
independently with probability δ. Therefore, W is a random
variable which takes on the number of total transmissions up
to and including the first successful reception of the packet,
and is thus geometrically distributed with success parameter
1 − δ. Then, Pr (W = j) = (1 − δ)δj−1 [11]. Let Eim and
Eiw denote the respective erasure outcomes in Qm and Qw
for the ith retransmission of the packet, where a one signifies
an erased packet as before. Therefore,
Pr (Ref ) =
∞∑
j=1
Pr(Ref |W = j) Pr(W = j)
=
∞∑
j=1
(1− Pr(E1w = · · · = Ejw = 1|E1m = · · ·
= Ej−1m = 1, E
j
m = 0)Pr(W = j)
=
∞∑
j=1
(
1−
(p11
δ
)j−1 p01
1− δ
)
(1 − δ)δj−1
= (1− δ)
∞∑
j=1
δj−1 − p01pj−111
= 1− p01
p11



 ∞∑
j=0
pj11

− 1


=
1− p11 − p01
1− p11 .
Now since p11 = ρ
√
δǫ(1− δ)(1− ǫ) + δǫ and p01 =
ρ
√
δǫ(1− δ)(1− ǫ) + ǫ(1− δ), then
Pr(Ref ) =
1− ǫ
1− ǫδ − ρ
√
δǫ(1− δ)(1 − ǫ) .
Clearly, this reduces to the independent case in (7) when
ρ = 0. Fig. 4 gives an example of Pr(D ≥ β) using this
expression for Pr(Ref ) where β is chosen to be 50. The figure
assumes C to be rate-1/2 with blocklength N = 10000, |R| =
N − k = 5000, and α = 1. Therefore, η = n/α = 5000.
We set δ = 0.5 and plot different ǫ values as ρ takes on all
possible values indicated by the bounds in (4). Fig. 4 implies
the existence of a correlation threshold ρth for Pr(D ≥ β), in
that if all other parameters are set, then for ρ < ρth, Pr(D ≥
β) ≈ 1. Yet, for ρ > ρth, Pr(D < β) is essentially one.
Notice, however, that when ǫ = 0.51, Pr(D ≥ 50) ≈ 1∀ρ.
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Fig. 4. Pr(D ≥ 50) when the number of packets η = 5000, α = 1, and
Bob’s erasure probability δ = 0.5. Results are plotted for varying erasure
probabilities ǫ for Eve’s channel as a function of the correlation coefficient ρ.
B. Security at the Correlation Bounds
Now that we understand how correlation affects the random
variable D, we evaluate the extreme cases in correlation
coefficients by considering the bounds on ρ in (4).
Consider the lower bound ρ = max(δ+ǫ−1,0)−δǫ√
δǫ(1−δ)(1−ǫ)
. Then,
Pr(Ref ) =
1− ǫ
1−max(δ + ǫ− 1, 0) . (9)
Therefore,
Pr(Ref ) =
{
1−ǫ
2−δ−ǫ if δ + ǫ > 1
1− ǫ otherwise (10)
If δ+ǫ > 1, this implies that Pr(Ref ) > 1−ǫ, which of course
is worse for secrecy than if δ + ǫ ≤ 1, all other things being
equal. When δ+ ǫ ≤ 1, Pr(Ref ) = 1− ǫ implies that negative
correlation can reduce the eavesdropper to an effective erasure
channel where only one chance is given to intercept each
packet, despite retransmission of some packets. Of course,
the reasoning behind this is that this minimum correlation
indicates that all of Eve’s missing packets are obtained by
Bob in the first transmission with probability one.
Now consider the upper bound ρ = min(δ,ǫ)−δǫ√
δǫ(1−δ)(1−ǫ)
. Then,
Pr(Ref ) =
1− ǫ
1−min(δ, ǫ) , (11)
which then implies that when Eve has at least as good of a
channel as Bob, i.e. δ ≥ ǫ, that the upper bound yields perfect
correlation, that is every packet is eventually received by Eve
error-free. However, if Bob can maintain a channel advantage
over Eve, i.e. δ < ǫ, then we see that Pr(Ref ) = 1−ǫ1−δ < 1.
Thus, even maximum correlation cannot reduce E[D] to zero.
Since E[D] grows with k in (6), this indicates that we can still
gain as many degrees of freedom as we desire on average by
increasing the dimension of the encoder.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, we have analyzed the secrecy coding and
ARQ scheme from [8] for correlated packet erasures in
the main and wiretap channels. Security results have been
compared with the results previously known for independent
erasures in the two channels. Furthermore, the overall se-
crecy effect of correlation is maximized when ρ takes on
its minimum value resulting in only one opportunity for an
eavesdropper to obtain every packet. The minimum security
due to correlation occurs at the upper bound of the correlation
coefficient, and can reduce the degrees of freedom to zero,
although if Bob can maintain even the slightest advantage in
overall channel quality, the degrees of freedom cannot go to
zero, and can be set arbitrarily by changing the dimension of
the encoder k. Thus, the physical-layer coding scheme retains
its security enhancement features in spite of correlation across
erasure channels.
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